We estimate four models of female labour supply using a Spanish sample of married women from 1994, taking into account the complete form of the individual's budget set. The models differ in the hypotheses relating to the presence of optimisation errors and/or the way non-workers contribute to the likelihood function. According to the results, the effects of wages and non-labour income on the labour supply of Spanish married women depend on the specification used. The model which has both preference and optimisation errors and allows for both voluntarily and involuntarily unemployed females desiring to participate seems to better fit the evidence for Spanish married women.
I.INTRODUCTION
The importance of specification issues in estimating labour supply models is well known 1 . Not only econometric aspects such as sample selection problems related to wages, the fact that the endogenous variable is censored, or the distributional assumptions 2 , but also other specification aspects are relevant. In that sense, the empirical literature has taken note of the importance of the characteristics of the budget set (tax system) 3 , the specification of different models for the participation decision and the hours equation 4 , the consideration of restrictions on labour supply 5 , or the analysis of household labour supply decisions rather than individual ones 6 .
In this paper we put forward evidence of the importance of modelling how the process of forming the observed decisions can take place. In particular, we estimate different models for the labour supply decisions of Spanish married women which differ in the assumptions about how the relationship between desired and observed participation and hours decisions are specified 7 . Additionally, we also try to shed some light on the impact of considering two different types of unobserved heterogeneity (preference and optimisation errors) against the case with only one source. The evidence, based on the estimated coefficients, on the explanatory power of the models and on the estimated wage and income elasticities, depends on these assumptions.
The models are estimated using the information contained in the 1994 and 1995 waves of the European Household Panel for Spain and they have a more realistic specification of the budget set than previous studies of the Spanish case, in terms of considering all the tax brackets 8 and allowing the possibility of choosing between separate and joint taxation as was possible in Spain in the period considered The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we present the main assumptions regarding individual preferences, budget constraints and the process of observing an individual as a non-worker or working a particular number of hours. The econometric specification is outlined in Section 3. In Section 4 we describe the data and the main characteristics of the Spanish tax system and we present the maximum likelihood estimates. In Section 5 wage and income elasticities are calculated and Section 6 sets out conclusions.
II. THE MODEL
We specify a static neoclassical labour supply model which incorporates the main characteristics of the Spanish tax system. The desired working time is assumed to be linear in wage and non-labour income. This latter variable includes the husband's income because we assume that the wife's labour behaviour is independent of that of her husband's. Besides those two explanatory variables, personal and household characteristics may contribute to explain female working time.
Finally, we add an unobserved heterogeneity random component in the utility function, which explains why two individuals with the same economic and socio-demographic characteristics can be working for a different number of hours per week.
Consumption and hours of work are determined so as to maximise the individual's utility function subject to a piecewise-linear budget constraint:
where U denotes utility, c is consumption expenditure, h is weekly working time, X is a vector of socio-demographic variables which may affect individual tastes, ε is the preference random term, w k is the after-tax hourly wage [w k = w(1-t k ), t k being the marginal tax rate for segment k and w the gross wage], y k , which is usually termed virtual income, is the intercept we would obtain if the segment k were extended to zero hours of work, H k is
ε X the upper kink point for segment k and T is the total time endowment. The subscripts referring to individuals are omitted in order to simplify the notation.
Thus, the budget constraint consists of a number, K, of segments, each one defined by its net wage, its virtual income, and the kink points.
Virtual income for tax bracket k is given by the following expression:
where y is the net non-labour income the wife receives when she does not work.
The specification of the budget set requires the calculation of the kink points, that is, the values of working time in which there is a change in the marginal tax rate. We then obtain the after-tax earnings at each kink and calculate the marginal tax rate of each segment by assuming that the budget set is linear between two consecutive kink points and that the marginal tax rate of a particular segment is greater than or equal to that of the previous one. In fact, the fiscal deductions and the possibility for married couples to choose either joint or separate taxation may produce nonconvexities in the tax schedule but, given the large number of tax brackets in the Spanish system, this linearization should not generate any special distortion in the results.
We assume a utility function which yields a linear labour supply with the following expression 11 :
where h s denotes the number of desired working hours, ε is the preference error, which is assumed to be normally distributed with constant variance
, and g k is the non-random component of the labour supply:
where a 1 , a 2 and b are parameters.
We specify four alternative models, which differ with regard to the hypothesis about the optimisation error and/or the likelihood contribution of non-workers. Model 1 considers that individuals are not always free to choose their working time, so there may be differences between the number of desired and usual hours of work and there may be involuntarily unemployed people
12
. We assume that workers always desire a positive working time, because they can stop working whenever they want. Non-
workers, however, may be in that situation either voluntarily or involuntarily. Thus, the observed working time will be equal to:
where h a is the actual working time, and υ, the optimisation error, which is normally distributed with variance σ o 2 and is independent of the preference error ε.
Model 2 assumes that there may be optimisation errors but every non-worker is voluntarily in that labour situation, i.e., both preferred and observed decisions coincide for them. The observed working time is thus given by:
The main hypothesis of Model 3 is that there are no differences between the desired and usual working time (h a = h s ), so there are no optimisation errors. Model 1 assumes that there is an optimisation error and allows for involuntary unemployment. As the usual working time may be different from the desired one, we do not know the value of the latter variable. For workers, we only know that they desire to work a positive number of hours, so the probability of a woman working h a i hours is equal to the joint probability of desired hours being at any point on the individual's budget constraint and observed hours being equal to h a i :
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The first term is the probability of observing a person working h a i hours per week when she desires to work along the segment k. Taking into account the assumptions about the labour supply function and the random terms, this probability can be written as:
The second term is the probability of desiring to work at any kink point (H k ) and working h a i and is given by:
The contribution to the likelihood of a non-worker is equal to the probability that she does not desire to work or she wants to work but has not found a job:
where the terms of the previous equation have the following expressions:
The log-likelihood function is constructed from the equations (7)- (11) and takes the form:
where d i is a dummy variable which takes the value of one when the individual is working and zero otherwise. Maximising the log-likelihood function produces estimates of the labour supply coefficients and the standard deviation of both random terms. In fact, equation (12) represents the general form of the likelihood function for our four models, which differ in the way the contributions of both workers and non-workers are defined.
Model 2 assumes that there are no involuntarily unemployed people. The likelihood function is the same as equation (12), but in this case the probability of being a non-worker is equal to the probability of being a non-participant:
In Model 3 we do not include optimisation errors, so the actual working time is always equal to the desired one. The construction of the likelihood function is simpler than the previous ones. The probability of observing zero hours of work is the same as in Model 2 [equation (13)]. On the other hand, the probability of working h a i hours, where h a i is located on segment k, is equal to the probability of desiring that value of working time:
Finally, Model 4 differs from the first one in the specification of the probability of non-working. According to Model 1, every non-worker may be voluntarily or involuntarily unemployed. Model 4 uses the information provided by the survey about the labour situation of these women. It assumes that those females who state that they are non-participants do not belong to the labour force, so their likelihood contribution is given by equation (13). Therefore, we have three types of contributions to the likelihood function, that of workers, that of involuntarily unemployed and that of voluntarily unemployed.
By comparing the estimation results for these four models we can evaluate the importance of the behavioural assumptions and the role of the error terms when estimating a labour supply model for married women in Spain, both in terms of the explanatory power of the models and in
terms of its influence on the estimated coefficients, in particular those relevant in economic terms, such as the income and wage elasticities.
IV. EMPIRICAL ESTIMATION
The estimation of the four models is based on a sample of married women drawn in 1994. In the first subsection, we describe the 1994 Spanish income tax focusing on the characteristics we have taken into account when specifying the budget constraint. In addition, we comment the sample selection and the variables used in the estimation. The second subsection presents the results of the estimation of the four models mentioned above.
Data and Spanish income tax system in 1994
Spanish income tax, known as IRPF (Impuesto sobre la Renta de las Personas Físicas), in 1994 is a piecewise linear function of taxable income, with the marginal tax rates increasing from 0% to 56%. Married couples have the possibility of complying with their fiscal duties jointly or separately. The number of tax brackets are eighteen or seventeen depending on the regime chosen.
Taxable income is the sum of gross labour and non-labour earnings minus some quantities that can be deducted before applying the tax rates, such as Social Security payments. After calculating the taxable income, the individual has to apply the table of marginal tax rates, and from the amount obtained he/she can make certain deductions. We have considered deductions for children, parents, wage income and house rent.
There are also other fiscal deductions, for example, housing allowances, but we do not have enough information to take account these into. Some of these deductions have limits which may introduce nonconvexities in the budget set. As we have already mentioned, when this happens we use a convex approximation, by assuming the linearity of the budget set between two consecutive kink points and establishing that the marginal tax rate in a segment is always greater or equal to that of the previous one.
Moreover, married couples can choose either to pay tax jointly or individually and they are likely to opt for the regime which implies the least amount of tax payment. We assume that those couples where the wife does not work pay tax jointly, because this is usually the best option for them, and when the woman works, we calculate the taxes the couple would pay under each regime and we assigned them the most favourable The wage is measured using information about monthly earnings and weekly working hours. The virtual income is calculated as previously explained [see equation (2)]. For its calculation we need the net nonlabour income the woman would have if she did not work and we assume that it consists of the net husband's labour earnings and the net family nonlabour earnings .
Labour supply is also influenced by a vector of socio-demographic variables (X). We assume that individual's age and health may influence labour supply decisions. This latter variable is equal to one for those women who are in good health and this is likely to have a positive effect on labour supply. Family characteristics included are the number of children under 14, the number of members over 14 and a dummy variable which takes the value one when the woman looks after children or adults.
Moreover, we incorporate the monthly payments due to mortgage loans as a way of capturing its effect through the budget set, since we do not have enough information to calculate housing allowances but we think the mortgage payments may increase the female labour supply. Finally, we have also incorporated regional dummies.
Results
In the estimation we have taken into account the fact that the wage is not observed for non-workers and it may be correlated with the labour supply random term 14 . To deal with these problems we substitute wages (observed or not) by its prediction, so the estimation has been carried out in three stages. First of all, we fit a probit model for the probability of working. Secondly, we estimate a wage equation with the subsample of workers and incorporating the inverse Mills ratio as an explanatory variable. The dependent variable in this equation is the (log) gross hourly earnings. We then calculate net wages and virtual incomes for each woman using the predicted gross wage. Finally, we estimate the female labour supply model by maximum likelihood. The estimates for the probit and the wage equation are shown in Tables A2 and A3 in the Appendix.
In Table 1 we report the maximum likelihood estimates of Model 1, which has two random terms and allows for involuntary unemployment.
We base our comments on the effects of the explanatory variables on the estimation which considers the most preferable tax regime. Wages have a positive effect on the desired labour supply whereas nonlabour income has a negative one, being both significantly different from zero. Therefore, these coefficients satisfy the Slutsky condition. Female age increases labour supply at a decreasing rate and mortgage payments also have a positive influence. On the contrary, but as expected, family characteristics -number of children under 14 and the dummy for children/adult caredecrease the labour supply of married women. This latter result confirms the importance of housework in explaining female labour behaviour. With regard to regional variables, women living in the East desire longer working hours than the rest. (TABLE 1) The standard deviations of both random terms are significant, being greater that of the preference error. The variation of the observed working time is therefore better explained by differences in individual tastes than by other types of reasons 15 . On the other hand, the significance of the optimisation error highlights the existence of differences between desired and observed working hours.
When comparing the three versions of Model 1 in Table 1 we must point out the significant increase in the value of the likelihood function when estimating the model in which the most preferable tax regime for each individual is considered. That means that the behaviour of individuals is better explained by a model based on a more complete utility maximization framework, proxied by the most favourable tax regime.
Consequently, the simplifications in terms of the budget set imposed by the versions corresponding to both the individual tax regime and the joint tax regime could imply inconsistent estimates, as shown, in particular, when looking at the estimates of the coefficients of the virtual income, positive in the joint tax regime version. Table 2 In particular, the nonlabour income is not now significant and the wage coefficient is much smaller than that of Model 1. (TABLE 2) Turning to Model 3, which assumes that there is no optimisation error, the most outstanding result is that the coefficient of nonlabour income is positive and significant, contrary to the theory. However, the substitution effect is positive when the working time is under 49. Although all the models show that labour supply decisions have a high degree of dependence on socio-demographic and economic variables and also present similar estimates for the variances of the error terms, the results show that the specification of how these decisions are made and the different role of unobserved error terms are relevant when modelling labour supply and estimating relevant parameters such as wage and income elasticities, as will be shown in the next section. In fact, the coefficient estimates of wage and income variables are higher in absolute value for Model 1 than for the rest of the models.
V. WAGE AND INCOME ELASTICITIES
The calculation of the wage and income elasticities will allow us to evaluate the responses of the female labour supply when any of those variables changes. As the budget set is piecewise linear, the labour supply is not differentiable because an increase in any explanatory factor may produce a change of segment or kink. That is the reason why prefer to obtain the elasticities by performing simulation exercises.
In the simulation, the values of the random terms are assigned to each woman in such a way that the predicted initial number of hours is the same as the observed one. For Model 1, we draw a value of the preference error for each woman, such that workers desire a positive number of hours. The optimisation error for that group is calculated as the difference between the desired and usual working time, whereas, for nonworkers, we draw a value of that term satisfying the condition that the predicted number of hours cannot be positive. In Model 2 the preference error assigned to non-workers cannot yield a positive desired number of working hours. In addition, in Model 3 the preference error for workers is just the difference between the hours of work and the non-random component of the labour supply function. Finally, the procedure applied to Model 4 differs from Model 1 in that the preference error is drawn in such a way that non-participants cannot be predicted desiring to work.
The first simulation exercise analyses the effect of a 10% increase in wages on participation and hours of work. The second one considers a 10% increase in the husband's earnings, which is part of his wife's nonlabour income. In both cases we add the individual effects over the whole sample. Table 3 presents the results for the wage elasticities of the simulations for the four models proposed, in the version which considers for each individual the most favourable taxation regime. In particular, we report the participation elasticity (which provides information about the variation in the number of participants), the elasticity of hours (which shows the change in average hours worked by participants), and the total elasticity, which is roughly the sum of the other two, for both desired and observed situations. (TABLE 3) According to the elasticities obtained for Model 1, wages have a positive effect on the number of women desiring to participate and on the desired number of hours conditional on participation. Given that there are a number of initial non-working women for whom the predicted number of weekly hours is very small after the increase in their wage, and as it is very unusual to observe such small values, we restrict the condition of participation to people working at least five hours a week when calculating the elasticities for the observed hours. These elasticities show more reasonable values than those obtained without this assumption. Moreover, our results are similar to those obtained in other studies applied to Spanish women. For example, García et al. (1989) compute a participation elasticity equal to 1.56 and the elasticity of hours conditional on work is 0.29, whereas those calculated in García et al. (1993) There are important differences in the elasticities depending on the model considered. For Models 2, 3 and 4 they are considerably smaller than those of Model 1, all, in fact, being lower than one, and with the elasticity of participation smaller than that of observed hours in the case of Models 2 and 3.
With respect to the income elasticities, we analyse the effect of a 10% increase in the husband's gross labour earnings. This variable only has an income effect on the labour supply of women who pay tax separately but, when the couple pay taxes jointly, its influence on female labour supply is more complex because the net wages can change for the first segment of the budget set. That is the reason why participation may increase, as it can be seen in Table 4 , where we report the income elasticities for all the models and for both desired and observed situations. (TABLE 4) In general, an increase in the husband's nonlabour earnings has a negative influence on the average desired working time. However, the observed participation increases for all four models. In any case, the response of participation and hours of work is very small (always lower than one), a result frequently obtained in the empirical literature about labour supply 16 . The estimated elasticities differ very much among the four models considered in this exercise.
As was expected after looking at the differences in the estimated coefficients and the explanatory power for those four models, we also find significant differences in the estimated wage and income elasticities depending on both behavioural assumptions and the specification of different sources for unobserved heterogeneity. 
